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I. Back-Drop
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid regions are characterized by sparse vegetation and low rainfall, receiving annual average amounts of between
500mm and 800mm. Covering 82% of Kenya’s entire territory, it also
contains 50% of Kenya’s total livestock herd. The land is communally
owned by the pastoralists groups inhabiting these areas, the major
ones being the Somali, Samburu, Rendille, Boran and Turkana. Livestock is individually owned and economic life revolves around the
household unit which usually consists of an extended family organized on kinship basis. The main drainage features are the Tana, Uaso
Nyiro, Turkwell and Dawa rivers. The economy is characterized by
the pastoral mode of production where different types of livestock
such as camel, cattle, sheep and goats are raised for subsistence and
increasingly, commercial purposes. The stock is moved within a natural ecological region that has fairly well-set boundaries. Traditional
patterns of land use are adhered to following cyclical variations in
rainfall (Campbell & Migot-Adholla, 1981:1).
The history of marginalization in Northern Kenya can be traced
back to the colonial era when Britain established a colonial protectorate
in the East African country at the turn of the nineteenth century. Nominally, their rule covered a vast stretch of land in northern Kenya that
they called the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Due to its remoteness, aridity and resistance by the Somali inhabitants, the British colonial government largely ignored the area in terms of development.
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They occupied themselves with policing the region and establishing
rudimentary administrative structures. For the duration of their rule,
the area remained underdeveloped (Turton, 1972:119–143).
The problem was compounded by the insistence of the Somalis
to be a distinct nation and their right to self-determination, a policy
they pursued peacefully in pre-independent Kenya and forcibly after
independence in 1963. The first decade of Kenya’s independence was
marked by government efforts to suppress the guerilla warfare that
was being carried out by Somali secessionists in the NFD. By 1970, the
secessionist movement was defeated militarily and, except for isolated
and ill-equipped bands roaming the countryside, the guerilla war had
come to an end. Despite this, the NFD remained relatively underdeveloped with the independent state of Kenya pursuing policies that were
reminiscent of colonial times. The region remained closed from the
rest of the country and, arbitrary and discriminatory laws were often
applied (Markakis, 1987:185).
II. The Role of the State
Why does the state intervene? In most cases in the developing world
the rationale for state intervention stems from the need to “modernize”
indigenous modes of production with a view to increasing efficiency
and productivity. Furthermore, and ideologically, whether in statist
or capitalist inspired countries, the idea is to transform the peasant
from a subsistence based pre-capitalist mode of production to one that
will ensure a surplus. The underlying philosophy is that what is “traditional” is antiquated, inefficient and incompatible with modern life.
Therefore, since the people are not willing to change, thus presenting
obstacles to development, the state has to be the major actor in bringing about change (Gefu, 1992:35).
The state has invariably blamed the underdevelopment of northern
Kenya on the scarcity of resources, aridity, remoteness, local resistance and insecurity. The identification of these problems has been
accepted by the state as the most rational and realistic explanation for
the marginalization of northern Kenya. There is no denying that these
are important factors in explaining and propagating state policies visà-vis the underdevelopment of this region or its disparities with other
regions in Kenya.
However, it is sometimes ignored that the state, having monopoly over a country’s resources and their redistribution can, and often
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does, use this power to restrict or stem undesirable tendencies manifested by a segment of the population. This forms the political aspect
in the study of regional development or disparities in a heterogeneous
state like Kenya. It is arguable that the past history of the NFD, the
desire for self-determination and secession, has shaped to a significant degree subsequent state policy with regard to development or
non-development of this area. As a response to earlier threats on state
sovereignty and territory, it is conceivable that the Kenyan state has set
up policies and institutions that inhibit development of this area. State
ambivalence may not be spelled in black and white, but it is tacit and
manifests itself in the administration of the region, now known as the
North-Eastern Province of Kenya, and the policies pursued by the state
with respect to development issues in the area (Markakis, 2011:153).
The overwhelming presence of the state in pre and post-colonial
Africa rendered the rural and urban masses virtually powerless and
at the mercy of state policies that hardly incorporated their views. A
core of elitist state planners set the agenda for development to tailor
their peripheral economies to the core capitalist economies. Thus, the
rural folk became marginalized and alienated from their governments.
But rather than become pliant victims of a much more organized institution such as the state, the rural communities exhibited their feelings
through the subtle presence of social struggle (Taylor & Mackenzie,
1992:1).
In areas where the state was able to supress organised communal
resistance, there emerged passive forms of that gave voice to the marginalized rural poor. Thus, what the state came to term as obstacles
to development viz apathy and the presence of obdurate and antiquated customs “could easily be translated by the rural folk as defense
mechanisms against the overwhelming presence of the state.” Popular
resistance to the violence meted out by the postcolonial Kenyan state
against the pastoralists manifested itself as banditry, cattle rustling
and disorder. This form of rural violence was often a response to state
or ruling class violence (Crummey, 1986:1). These manifestations of
violence against the central state have persisted for much of the postcolonial history of Northern Kenya.
State policies that encourage the settlement of pastoralists without
offering them a viable alternative contribute to the increasing impoverishment of these inhabitants of the dry lands. Land use practices
engaged in or encouraged by the state, such as irrigation, have only
served to alienate pastoralists from their prime grazing lands. Most of
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the irrigation schemes that have been set up in the dry lands of Kenya
do not benefit the indigenous inhabitants as migrant farmers are settled in these schemes. Large tracts of land have also been set-aside as
game parks and national reserves with the attendant restrictions on
pastoralist use of these lands.
Encouraging crop production in marginal areas has only served to
aggravate land degradation in already fragile environments. At the
same time, there has been a significant neglect of the livestock sector
in dry lands, especially camel pastoralism, as the state pursues agricultural policies designed to increase crop production in an effort to
promote local self-sufficiency. The problem with dry lands in Kenya,
therefore is one that can easily be traced to state planners and bureaucrats who design policies from their insulated positions at the center while disregarding traditional practices of dry land management
(Hogg, 1987: 47).
III. Environmental Desiccation
The economic problems of sub-Saharan African countries have been
compounded by the rapid degradation of their environment. Problems like soil erosion, deforestation and desertification have had a
great impact on land use and agricultural production, often leading
to adverse and seemingly irreversible conditions. Environmental degradation has had its greatest impact on the inhabitants of these threatened lands i.e., the rural poor. Their conditions of life have plunged
below the poverty line and their survival is often precarious (Hope,
2008:2).
The stress on land resources has been blamed on a variety of factors
like excessive grazing, competition for increasingly scarce land, cutting
of trees for fuel wood and general misuse of land resources. These
factors all stem from the human pressure on renewable resources in
the environment (Southgate and Disinger, 1985:1). Planners have been
quick to apportion blame for the ecological disasters to the perceived
agricultural malpractices of the rural poor.
Undoubtedly, the rural poor have played some role in the environmental mess we find ourselves in today. However, in many instances,
the state and its planners have been the major cause of environmental
disaster in arid lands, and the rural peasantry has merely acted in
response to state policies that are in themselves adverse to traditional
agricultural practices and sustainability of the environment. These pol-
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icies have evoked responses from the rural poor that have been interpreted as being threatening to the ecology. This situation not only
applies in Northern Kenya, but also in the Sahelian states of Africa,
where the human and physical condition of the dry lands is very similar.
One of the major areas of concern has been the rapid rate of desertification in many African countries. The rate of forest and woodland
clearing has been alarming. It has been estimated that the forest areas
in developing countries are being cleared at the rate of 17 million
hectares a year (Sitarz, 1994). The loss in vegetation cover’ results in
accelerated soil erosion and its attendant problems. There is no doubt
that desertification is taking place at an accelerated rate. The impact of
this rapidly degrading rural environment in many sub-Saharan African countries has been compounded by periodic bouts of drought.
The drought cycles of the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s are significant in this
respect. They have led to a greater stress on the land and have accelerated the disruptive effects of human activity in fragile ecosystems. The
resultant degradation has led to soil erosion, absence of firewood for
energy and the persistent problem of creeping deserts.
IV. Development Paradigms and the Roots of Marginalization
The approach of development from below is usually criticized as
neo-populist and utopian (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992:28). Local communities are seen to be diverse in composition and interests. Empowering the people means a transfer of power from the state. The presence
of predatory states in Africa clearly showed the contradictions of maintaining state power and empowering the people at the same time. The
response of the state in Kenya, and indeed in much of Africa, has been
to place the blame on the pastoralists’ patterns of land use in marginal
areas. Overgrazing and overstocking of herds on marginal areas have
been cited as major culprits. (Hogg, 1987: 47) The answer to land degradation in dry lands then obviously becomes the management and
improvement of these pastoralist practices, with a view to eliminating
or substituting harmful use of the land.
The state in Kenya therefore has instituted measures which include
rural afforestation schemes, soil conservation measures, animal grazing restrictions and the settling of pastoralists. Some of the activities
are laudable in their intent, but they do not often achieve results.
Range development practices assume that technology and new range
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practices will improve traditional pastoralism. As Morris notes in his
study of the Maasai Range Development Project initiated by USAID,
this premise is fundamentally wrong (Moris, 1981:99–113). His study
shows that the range management project among the Maasai failed
after ten years in operation and had to be abandoned. It illustrated the
chasm between official project and state policy and the actual situation
on the ground. It highlights the loss of prime grazing lands by pastoralists to farmers. The study concludes that the pastoral problem is essentially a systems problem (Morris, ibid.:12). The state also assumes that
the pastoralists cannot take care of their own rangelands, a common
notion stemming from the “tragedy of the commons” concept (Hardin,
1968:1244). However, pastoralists do behave in an ecologically sound
manner and adhere to age old principles of land management and use.
State interference increasingly limits their ability to continue practicing
ecologically sound land management policies (Hogg, ibid.:47–58). The
government emphasizes destocking as a means of curbing overgrazing
and soil erosion. This is a resort to treating symptoms instead of preventing the causes.
While to the centrist state it is the most inimical feature of pastoralism, the most significant strategy, from the viewpoint of pastoral life,
is mobility (Toure, 1988:34). The pastoralist moves his herd of livestock
from one designated area to another according to the dictates of the
weather. In his movement, the pastoralist seeks to maximize the utility
of his scarce resources i.e., water and pasture. In order to do this, he
must be equipped with a keen knowledge of his environment. Thus, it
is a mistake to say that pastoralist move from one area to another haphazardly. It implies that the pastoralist is not fully aware of his environment. As is evident in many studies, the movement of pastoralist
is closely regulated and their range of territory remains defined, albeit
that a certain measure of fluidity is allowed to take into account the
unpredictability of the weather. At any local level, rangelands are identified and categorized as dry or wet weather pastures and movement is
organized according to seasons. Pastoralists have evolved patterns of
migrations to coincide with dry and wet season patterns. These movements take place within well-defined ecological boundaries that contain a diversity of vegetation and topography (Pratt & Gwynne, 1977).
The greatest asset a pastoralist has is his ability to move.
Besides environmental consequences, pastoralists also move as a
response to social or cultural factors such as the attendance of ceremonial rituals, adverse political conditions and war. Unfortunately,
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the last two reasons are becoming more and more the reasons why
pastoralists move. The implications of conflict for the pastoralist are
particularly grim, especially when coupled with adverse environmental conditions like drought. Displacement of pastoralist peoples often
assumes tragic proportions under such conditions.
The problem with dry land management practices in Kenya is not
the pastoralists inhabiting them but the state planners in the urban
cities who dish out ill-advised prescriptions. This is in line with the
diffusion model that the state adheres to as a matter of ideology and
practice (Gefu, 1992, ibid.). In order to study the problem of rural
development in Northern Kenya, it is necessary to examine the important and often conflicting roles played by the two major actors i.e.,
the state and the people at the grassroots. From one perspective, it is
necessary to examine the policies of the state, the underlying issues
and assumptions that dictate or shape these policies. From the other
perspective, it is necessary to examine the socio-cultural, economic and
ecological imperatives that provide the basic impetus and motivation
of the pastoralists and is often a critical determinant in gauging their
reactions to the state or outside players in their life.
In the background, shadowing these two players is perhaps the
third major player: the environment. Both the pastoralist’s way of life
and the government policies are designed to mitigate the effects of an
otherwise harsh climate. The loss of power and ability to cope with
the harsh environment has made pastoralists even more susceptible
to adverse weather and drought. This loss of power can be traced to
inappropriate outside intervention. The affected pastoralists are mired
in poverty with its attendant problems of poor health, illiteracy, voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation and the lack of basic infrastructure
(Narayan et al. 2000: 4–5). Attendant to this is the loss of traditional
resource bases and a decline in traditional survival strategies. Thus
a study of the ecology of the pastoralists and their reactions to it is
imperative in order to situate the problem of rural development in
marginal lands in its proper context (Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder, 1977).
It is also important to highlight who determines the discourse of
development in these arid lands, especially in, light of some of the
current debate on rural participation, and who the active or passive
players are. The emphasis on participation may degenerate into building institutions that have more form than substance. Closely tied to
this is the transfer of inappropriate technology to the rural area that
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often results in further degradation of the environment that leads to
more serious and longer-term implications. All in all, the picture that
emerges is one of outside players determining the fate and future of
areas they poorly understand. The dilemma of intervention is that it
can be positive and negative, depending on whether the donor dictates
to the recipients or whether it’s a mutually agreed approach.
V. Deconstructing the Path of Development
In order to have a more sustainable approach to developing marginal
lands, it is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of previous policies and plans.
It is also necessary to incorporate alternatives based on the experience
of the people involved. It is imperative to re-examine these policies,
their impacts on the pastoralists and suggest alternative approaches to
rural development in arid lands.
In analyzing policies, it is important to note that policy goals and
their interpretation are often accompanied by value judgments. Thus,
the goals outlined on paper may reach the grassroots in distorted fashion. This distorted version is crucial because it is the basis of intervention on the ground, and thus far outweighs the original blueprint. It is
difficult to pin down such distorted policy versions, but perhaps the
best indicators are gleaned from the actual running of development
projects and the reaction from the people directly affected by them.
The roots of marginalization in Northern Kenya run deep if viewed
from both a historical and ecological perspective. There have been
fundamental weaknesses in the paradigms that have been the model
for undertaking development in the pastoral lands of northern Kenya.
A critical evaluation of these paradigms should be the basis for deconstructing long-held myths about pastoralists who have not only shouldered the burdens of failed interventions, but also the blame. The lack
of political will on the part of the state to mitigate its neglect of this
area is almost concomitant with the willingness to blame the victims.
State policies per se, as outlined in government documents, do not tell
the whole story.
Initially, the Kenyan state approached development from a neo-classical point of view, with emphasis on the center as opposed to the
peripheries. Government policy makers felt that the growth of the
center would automatically lead to a spatial diffusion of growth to the
peripheries (Stohr & Taylor 1981). Government’s refusal to deal with
internal problems like nationalism among ethnic groups within the ter-
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ritory, have led to a blanket treatment of regional differences, thereby
exacerbate instead of reducing the problem (Seers, 1983).
Experience has shown that this centrist ideology not a wholly accurate vision. The experience in much of colonial and post-colonial Africa
has been a strong centralized state. This resulted in a centralizing of
development planning that would later be criticized as remote and
inaccessible to the majority of the rural poor. Strong centralized governments emerged in post-independence Africa, usually dominated
by a single party. Due to the strong pull of centralization, the last
vestiges of rural power that remained in the local or district councils
were removed and governments stepped in to take over the provision
of social services and infrastructure. Under this commandist approach,
Kenya achieved a high rate of economic growth with an annual average real growth rate of seven percent (Godfrey, 1986). The government
had placed stress on and encouraged.the growth of the productive
sectors in the country. Thus, areas growing prime commodity ‘crops
like coffee and tea witnessed rapid growth while the rest of the country lagged behind. There emerged widening regional disparities in the
country despite the fact that there was a high rate of economic growth
(Nyongo, 1987).
The centralist approach has also been reproached for concentrating
on economic goals at the expense of other equally important social
needs. Regional and income inequalities emerged in countries pursuing a purely centralized form of development planning. The trickle-down effect never materialized and large segments of the rural
population continued to live in poverty. Even the shift from this paradigm in the early 1990s to one that emphasized development from
below and the current district based devolution shift came too late and
has had little impact on the life of pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Consequently, there has been no substantial effect on the development of
the dry lands of Northern Kenya to date.
The path of “development” that the government has followed
include the settling of pastoralists in towns and villages, ostensibly to
provide them with the necessary government services such as health
and education, as well as instilling in them a sense of “nationhood.”
Sedentary agricultural practices are also encouraged as a way of
increasing food production, combating desertification, and improving the standard of living among the inhabitants of these dry lands.
The ultimate goal is to make them “self-sufficient,” the assumption of
course being that pastoralism promotes dependency on the state. The
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irony is that these misguided policies have made the once self-sufficient pastoralists even more dependent on the state, as the widespread
and continuous use of famine relief aptly illustrates (Hogg, 1983:64–
168).
These policies, however, ignore the basic fact that rotational pastoralism has evolved as the best possible response to the adverse ecological conditions that prevail in the dry lands, and that, to a large extent,
the mobility of pastoralists is motivated by sound ecological considerations that permit the regeneration of denuded lands and optimal use
of prime grazing lands (Dahl & Hjort, 1979). Efforts to develop Kenya’s
dry lands and combat environmental degradation address themselves
to the symptoms rather than the causes. A radical shift is needed in
government policies in order to reverse environmental degradation
and promote sound use of the dry lands. The state has to recognize
the values of nomadic pastoralism by adopting policies that foster and
improve this indigenous system of dry land management, instead of
imposing alien and pre-packaged models that produce more harm
than good.
Moreover, the state must encourage the participation of people in
the development processes affecting them. Advocates of development
from below emphasize these points: self-reliance among the rural populace and the use of appropriate technology at the grassroots level
and to define a new strategy whose objective is “no longer economic
growth but social development, with focus on specific human needs in
congruence with the ecological constraints. In such a context, planning
for rural development must become decentralized, participatory and
deeply immersed in the particulars of local settings. Here, qualitative
judgments, as much as quantitative techniques, must be creatively and
transactively combined (Friedman & Douglas, 1978:163–192).
Despite decades of experimentation with various development
approaches, the problems of poverty and decline in economic well-being persist. The rural poor are becoming more marginalized and powerless to change their adverse conditions. The path of “development”
that the state has followed include the settling of pastoralists in towns
and villages, ostensibly to provide them with the necessary government services such as health and education, as well as instilling in
them a sense of “nationhood.” Sedentary agricultural practices are
‘also encouraged as a way of increasing food production, combatting
desertification, and improving the standard of living among the inhabitants of these dry lands. The ultimate goal is to make them “self-suf-
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ficient,” the assumption of course being that pastoralism promotes
dependency on the state. These policies, however, ignore the basic fact
that rotational pastoralism has evolved as the best possible response to
the adverse ecological conditions that prevail in the dry lands; and that
to a large extent, the mobility of pastoralists is motivated by sound ecological considerations that permit the regeneration of denuded lands
and optimal use of prime grazing lands. Efforts to develop Kenya’s
dry lands and combat environmental degradation address themselves
to the symptoms rather than the causes. A radical shift is overdue in
government policies in order to reverse environmental degradation
and promote sound use of the dry lands. The state has to recognize
the values of nomadic pastoralism by adopting policies that foster and
improve this indigenous system of dry land management, instead of
imposing alien and pre-packaged models that produce more harm
than good.
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